In Harmonium

Posted By Marc on April 3, 2007

Recently, a very interesting thread appeared on the Small Wars Council called What is our message (the same post was made at Marine Gazette, but has received no responses yet).  The author, posting under the name Horatius, asked a very simple question

We talk about I/O, PsyOps, cultural awareness, etc. but what is our message? In Iraq and Afghanistan, there is no specific guidance as to why we are in Iraq. What EXACTLY are our squad leaders supposed to tell locals?

He then proceeds to go through all of the buzz words that have dominated the last 4 years and does a masterful job of showing why they are all hollow.  Horatius raises a very interesting question that many people have asked, and the ensuing discussion at SWC is generating some very interesting answers (as it always does).

Rhetoric aside, what is the message?

While the answers, on the whole, boil down to a “we’re trying to make things better for people” message, the discussion has highlighted a few very interesting problems with the context of the question, namely who is the audience.

One thing that should be blindingly apparent to anyone following the GWOT, or even watching TV, is that the irhabi networks such as AQ and AQI are very successful in using new communications technologies to recruit sympathizers and to shape the global, as well as local, perceptions of their actions.  Why, then, is the Coalition so poor?

I think that the answer to this lies in the very concept of “communications”  as “both” sides use it.  For the irhabi of AQ and their MB progenitors, the new communications technologies offer an unparalleled way to “bring the jihad” to people and to “show the world” that the “Great Satan” can be beaten on IED at a time.
This ability takes advantage of certain current social trends which I outlined in a post in that thread.

One of the nice pieces of research, like the wheel, that has been popping up over (and over again! in) the past 20 years or so is the concept of a “diasporic community” that is linked together by communications nodes. As the communications technologies change (i.e. changes in bandwidth, transmission speed, source / reception symmetries, etc.), we see a shift in how these diasporic communities interact on a day-to-day basis and how this changes individual member’s sense of “consciousness”. Very roughly, low bandwidth, low transmission speed and technologies with a broadcast bias e.g. TV, Radio, the printing press, etc.) have a tendency to make it easier to perceive a group as “them” (think “classic” WWII or Soviet propaganda). High bandwidth, high transmission speed and highly interactive technologies make it easier to perceive a group as “us” (SWC ). This latter effect is exactly what is driving the international AQ recruitment strategy.

So, let’s flip it around and go back to an hypothetical mosul.ia.iq site. As long as there is high bandwidth, i.e. a lot of content, high transmission speed, i.e. the content changes rapidly, and high interactivity, i.e. people around the world can “get involved”, then we can use these technological effects to our advantage at both the local and global levels (the process is called “glocalization”). In effect, we are creating a “virtual community” that is focused on a geographic community.

Now, let’s follow up on a couple of other facts:

1. There are a lot of ex-pat Iraqis who either come from or whose ancestors came from Mosul (or any other locale), and who still have family there.
2. Many Iraqis have a very strong sense of “family”, even the ex-pats and their descendants (the “diasporic community), and this would give them a “place” to interact with, find out about, and help their relatives.

Doing “good works” on the ground is, I think we all agree, a very successful strategy. But does this mean that it must be the MNF that actual does them and pays for them? I think the answer is actually “no”, as long as the MNF facilitates them. So, for example, let’s suppose that Mosul needs a primary school, plus all of the associated supplies. What is to stop our hypothetical mosul.ia.iq from having a VBulletin forum with a projects section including a project aimed at building such a school, including accepting donations, volunteers, etc.? Nada .

What would that do? Well, in addition to all the local stuff, it would let a primary school in Boise or Des Moines “adopt” the project; it would let a civil engineer in Montreal “donate” blueprints; and, more importantly, it would let the Mosul diasporic community see that they can help their relatives by doing something other than sending money to so-called “charities” like Hamas and Hizbollah. Ideally, the entire financial side would be totally transparent as well.

This is the type of symbolic warfare strategy I’m thinking about – one that takes advantage of diasporic communities and current technologies, and one that has a spin off effect of spiking the soi-dissant “liberals” guns by showing the world all the good works that are going on. Most people, I think would agree with the comment that “actions speak louder than words”, but if a large part of the target audience can’t “hear” that speech, then it has no effect on them.

Category: COIN
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