In Harmonium

Posted By Marc on December 22, 2008

It certainly seems as if my previous post on the idea of evaluating the HTS caused a fair bit of reaction on both theoretical and epistemological grounds.  I thought it would be worthwhile to pull out some of the ideas I talked about in that post a little more.  And, I’ll admit, that I was more that a bit prickly over Jeff’s accusation that I was using both modernist and Post-Modernist models .

Some thoughts on epistemologies, theory and moral valuations

Let me start by re-iterating my position on epistemology: “epistemology”, or “how do we know what we know”, is a set of sets of rules for determining the logic by which we can say we “know” something.  In general, there are three main forms of this – call them meta-epistemologies – that are associated with different forms of logic: deduction, induction and abduction (see here for more).

These logics, and the frequency distribution of each type within a given theoretical model, establish the “mapping conventions” of that model: what is and is not “data” and what the relationships are in the slice of reality – a “territory” – they are attempting to “map” (including temporal linkages such as causality and para-causality [e.g. "mutual arising"]).  In effect, they define what information – a “difference that makes a difference” – may be produced using that model.

Now the construction of a theory also includes two other key interactions: social communications and moral valuations.  The first, social communications, should be obvious; mapping conventions are a form of language regardless of the sign system used (words, chords, mathematical notation, rhyming conventions, etc.).  As such, in order for that mapping convention to be adopted it must have some competitive advantage (in the Darwinian sense) over other mapping conventions competing in the same “space”.  That advantage could be a positive selection criterion – “it gives better / more accurate prediction” – or it could be a negative selection criterion – “this is the official standard, use it or else”.

The second key interaction within a theory is a set of moral valuations.  This, I believe, is the area that Jeff was pointing to with his comments about the “separateness” of science from society.  Now moral valuations show up in a number of ways, and I want to highlight three of them.  First, there are moral valuations made in the very basis of the mapping convention when “data” and linkages are established.  For example, in the debates surrounding Anthropological ethics, one of the crucial “ethical” points is thgat one should not publish material that will cause “harm” to one’s informants.  In effect, this says that an entire class of observations – statements or actions that, in the opinion of the researcher may cause harm to rebound on the informants – may not be considered as “data”.

The second way in which moral valuations appear in theoretical models is in the truth-claims that are used during the selection process (cf Joel Best, 1987 – PDF).  These truth-claims are rhetorical (rather than “rational”), and are tailored to fit a specific socio-cultural milleau.  For example, Montgomery McFate’s 2005 article on Anthropology and Counterinsurgency, attempts to establish a series of truth-claims.  Now, the key thing to remember behind this is that rhetorical competition for the acceptance of a theoretical model takes place within a nested set of audiences each of which has its own, sometimes competing, criteria by which to judge the validity of truth-claims.  In the case of the HTS and the McFate 2005 article, one of the key truth-claims is “efficiency”; a claim that works well in a military audience, but very poorly in an Anthropology audience.

The third way in which moral valuations enter into theoretical models is via another selection process: what someone chooses to study with that model.  This was the other part that, I believe, Jeff was alluding to since funding is a crucial component here.   This is the point at which other groups in a society can really influence the moral valuations of a theoretical model either by providing or withholding resources and/or support.  The reason why this happens is simple – researchers are individuals who have to live and are driven by the same motivations as other people (e.g. food, shelter, clothing, status, etc.).

Evaluating what?

When it comes right down to it, any evaluation of a program must be clear about what it is evaluating.  When I called for an evaluation of the HTS, I was calling for an evaluation of several different things.  First, there should be an evaluation of the truth-claims made by the program within the military context.  Is it actually reducing kinetic operations? Is it increasing the effectiveness of COIN operations?  Is it materially hampering the operations of the “enemy”?  Is it measurably changing the attitudes of military commanders and troops in terms of the TTP’s they employ?

Second, there should be an evaluation of the efficiency of the program in bureaucratic terms.  In comparison with other programs of a similar size and age, is it managed “efficiently”?  Are its HR policies and practices in keeping with “industry standards” [of other bureaucratic programs]?  Are its technical assets (e.g. the reachback centre, the MapHT program, etc.) on a developmental par with other, similar programs?  Are its accounting procedures on a par with similar programs? Etc., etc., etc.

Now, both of these sets of evaluations are based on objectively definable criteria.  By that, I do not mean that they are “objective” but, rather, that we can determine comparable sets, create a baseline and treat that as if it were objective.  The next set of evaluations is much harder.

The third set of evaluations should be “ethical”.  Some people inside the Anthropology crowd do not appear to realize that the US Department of Defense has some of the most stringent ethics guidelines for research conducted on human subjects.  Consider, by way of example, Title 32, CFR, Part 219 – Protection of Human Subjects from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (PDF).   This established a minimum baseline for research actions taken by DoD employees, and it should be compared and contrasted with the AAA Code of Ethics to establish points of overlap, agreement, disagreement and differing extensions (i.e. areas where there is no overlap).  The actions of HTTs should then be compared against this composite ethical “baseline”.

Now a program review, which is what I was calling for, is more than just an “evaluation” – program reviews evaluate and, as a result of their evaluations, point towards areas whereby the program can, should and must “improve”.  Program reviews are also rhetorical tools in the sense that they will be used as part of the ongoing social theatre surrounding programs; Canadian Royal Commissions might well be the exemplar of this.  And it is at this point that striving for a separation of science and society is so crucial.

Knowing that a review will be used as part of a debate does not mean that one should take an active political stance within that debate as part of that review.  This is where I believe one must, in order to act in an ethical manner, be as objective as possible or, in other words, practice Zeteticism (or Pyrrhonism if you prefer).

Category: Epistemology, Ethics, Human Terrain System (HTS), Uncategorized
Tags: Human Terrain System (HTS), Moral valuations, Program Review, Science and Society