In Harmonium

Posted By Marc on December 24, 2008

A recent report by the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission has been something of a hot potato for Canadian (and US) troops lately.  Entitled From Hope to Fear: An Afghan Perspective on Operations of Pro-Government Forces in Afghanistan, the report highlights two central types of operations that are extremely problematic:

AIHRC is concerned that lack of coordination among PGF [Pro-Government Forces] and also between PGF and local government authorities may lead them to act on unreliable sources or faulty intelligence, increasing the risk of civilian casualties. In cases of night raids and other ground operations, international military forces’ lack of expertise and familiarity with Afghan culture and local tradition have often led them to unnecessarily offend and traumatize local communities.

The use of both of these “tactics” (I’ll come back to this later) has been defended by Canadian Forces commanders in recent CBC reports (QuickTime).  Brig.-Gen. Denis Thompson (OIC of CF and NATO forces in Kandahar) is quoted as saying that

…such actions are taken only “as a last resort” and that he is confident that his soldiers are following international law….

“Every precaution is taken to ensure there is a have a high degree of certainty regarding targets” when air strikes or nighttime raids are launched, Thompson said, adding he is proud of Canada’s “exemplary” track record in Afghanistan.

“Task Force Kandahar troops — both U.S. and Canadian — take extraordinary efforts to minimize collateral damage and to avoid harm to innocent civilians,” he said.

“as a last resort”…. Not to impugn Brig.-Gen. Thompson in any manner, but I find the use of that phrase exceedingly disturbing for a number of reasons.  First, to my mind, that phrase implies a sense of desperation which, while somewhat understandable given the deplorable troop levels in the province (plus the low levels of equipment and dubious “support” from many NATO allies), is still disturbing since it also implies that the command staff is starting to feel desperate.  I have no idea if that is accurate, although in the broadcast interview with CBC (QuickTime) a certain level of frustration was clearly evident.

The second reason I find the phrase disturbing is that it implies, to me at least, that the initiative has shifted in the minds of the CF to the Taliban.  By “initiative”, I mean the ability of one combatant to manipulate another combatant in such a manner that the other combatant weakens himself (what Gordon Dickson once described as the Tactics of Mistake).  I really can’t think of a better way for the Taliban to “win” than by having the NATO forces do their bombings for them while, at the same time, using CF and NATO troops to conduct half of their IO – the part about “foreign occupiers”.

Tactics

Let me return, for a moment, to the concept of “tactics”.  Now, there are a number of different ways to parse out military operations from the tactical-operational-strategic of the US, to the tactical-grand tactical-strategic-grand strategic of the Europeans (I prefer the latter).  What each of these taxonomies does, however, is to parse out the operational environment (in Rappaport’s sense of the term) into “micro-ecologies”, each of which has its own selection criteria (in the Darwinian sense).

Now, regardless of which taxonomy one uses, “tactics” refers to the “lowest” level of military operations; “lowest” in the sense of most temporally and spatially immediate.  The “problem” with this is that what may well be a positive selection criterion (i.e. it increases immediate survival) at the tactical level may be a negative selection criterion at the strategic or grand strategic level, and this, I would argue, is the case with the use of both air strikes and night raids.  While both tactics are “legal” under international law, their legality is immaterial when measured against their strategic effect.

Dickson’s concept of the Tactics of Mistake is not “new”: it derives, in a large part, from the writings of Sun Tzu.  The basic concept involved is simple: get your opponent to put himself off balance by manipulating his perceptions of the battlefield – a classic form of disinformation that, when done properly, manipulates the opponents mental map of operational “reality” to the point where what you want them to do is what they see as their most logical action.  In effect, one opponent manipulates the other to the point where they dictate the others’ tactics.

Strategic logic in asymmetrical warfare

I’m not going to go into much detail on this since I’ve written about it elsewhere (e.g. here and here) and there are some excellent sources on it (see here for example).  Let me just say that there are very sound reasons why tactics must be subordinate to strategic considerations and, in the case of Afghanistan, the primary strategic consideration has to be Afghan perceptions of the actions of NATO forces.

Now, in a conventional conflict, the strategic selection criteria are shared by the various opponents, while in an asymmetric conflict, they are not shared.  Sounds simple, but it is very tricky for many people to internalize this and act upon it since they “know” that they are “right” (in phenomenological terms, this is a “natural attitude”).

At the same time as the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission issued their report on NATO actions, they also released a report on Insurgent Abuses against Afghan Civilians that

…focuses on serious violations of Islamic principles, domestic and international law caused by the Taliban from 2006 to mid 2008. The actions documented are in direct contravention to Islamic Shari’a, Afghan domestic and international law. All three sources provide clear strictures about the protection of civilians during armed conflict, which are set out in the report. A panel of respected Islamic scholars has provided a religious interpretation of these breaches, using the principles of Islamic Shari’a. While the Taliban claim to observe Islamic principles, which they consider above the strictures of domestic and international humanitarian law, this claim will be largely disproved.

The report goes on to note (p.4) that

In an attempt to weaken the Afghan government, insurgents in Afghanistan are systematically terrorizing the civilian population with “night letters,” kidnappings, executions (often by beheading) and other crimes. Their targets include doctors, teachers, students, government aligned elders, Ulema Council members, civilian government employees, suppliers and day laborers of public-interest reconstruction work and military bases, as well as former police and military personnel. Others, such as unassociated relatives of civil servants, have also been targeted. (See, From Intimidation to Murder, below.) In an attempt to further weaken public support for the government, insurgents have also begun violent campaigns of intimidation against schools, medical services, humanitarian aid and commercial supply lines. (See, Far Reaching Consequences of Insurgent Abuses, below.)

If one were to weigh the crimes of the insurgents, as documented in this report, against the “collateral damage” caused by NATO forces documented in the first report, one might be excused for thinking that an “Ooops, sorry ’bout that” was not in the same league as the systematic terrorization, kidnapping and beheading of civilians.  One would also be wrong in terms of strategic thinking.

In Asymmetric war, strategy is about relationships

Let me go back to some basics in asymmetric warfare – the strategic target is the population (yes, I am in the population-centric crowd).  Unfortunately, ever since the advent of the Scientific Way of Warfare there has been an increasing, “abstraction” let’s call it, of people and their lived realities from conventional military planning.  This same “abstraction” or “alienation” appears to be a result of the increasing mechanization and bureaucratization of societies (cf Durkheim’s The Division of Labor in Society), although one could certainly argue otherwise.

Within this “scientific” form of warfare, “grand strategy” has increasingly been focused on manipulating the perceptions of the rulers of increasingly bureaucratized nation states.  Where the “convention” aspect of “conventional warfare” comes in is in the pre-supposition that ones opponent shared the same “logic” of modernity and, where they did not, one should strive to annihilate their alternate “logic” (e.g. the Imperial state in Japan, the NAZI party in Germany, Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the Taliban in Afghanistan, etc.) when “necessary” (as defined by your logic) and replace it with one’s own logic.  As Tom Lehrer noted

Asymmetric warfare, however, is not governed by these conventions.  Asymmetric warfare is all about “selling” (in the old robber baron sense) a specific populace an “alternate” logic whether that is the pie-in-the-sky “liberation” pseudo-theology of the “national liberation movements”, the fascist logic of the drug cartels in Columbia or the Taliban in Afghanistan or the revitalization movement, “Golden Age” visions sold by extremist militias in the US and Al Qaeda wordwide.  Asymmetric warfare is all about “selling” a competing view of social relations.

Strategically, however, this creates a major problem.  Think about it for a minute: how easy do you think it is for someone who assumes that their view of social relations is “natural” to “sell” it to people who don’t view it that way?  And, lest someone jump in with blither about a “free marketplace of ideas”, let me point out that this “sales pitch” is not operating in anything approaching Adam Smith’s definition of a “Free Market”; it is operating in overlapping and intersecting Darwinian (not Spencerian, a point forgotten by most politicians) ecologies.

Which, in my usual roundabout way, gets me back to why “conventional” tactics such as air strikes and night raids are negative selection criteria in the strategic sphere.

What are you “selling”?

In a population-centric, asymmetric conflict, each “side” (and there may well be hundreds of “sides”) is “selling” a particular vision and version of a set of social relationships.  The current “product” being “marketed” by NATO is, loosely speaking, a Liberal-Democratic form of government with all the atomization, bureaucratization, general material prosperity and personal security that that implies.  On the other hand, the Taliban are selling a theocratic form of government with all of the thought and action controls that that implies.  The competing ad copy might read as “Freedom through Individual freedom” vs “Freedom through Submission”.

Now, which one do you think the Afghan people are more likely to accept?  Please note, and this is crucial, I did not phrase that as “likely to want” – I wrote “accept“.  In a population-centric conflict, “acceptance” is crucial, and this is where the Taliban hold an advantage over the NATO forces and the Karzai government.  A large part of the Afghan population already knows what to expect from the Taliban since they have already lived under a Taliban government.  This means that they already know how to survive.  A much smaller percentage of the current Afghan population has lived under a Liberal-Democratic government; it is a “foreign” invention.

Along the same lines, “Freedom through Individual freedom” is much less familiar than “Freedom through Submission”.  Indeed, the concept of “individuality” (actually under state control) is anathema to basic concepts of kinship and Islamic thought; which makes it a “hard sell”.  Note, however, I wrote “hard”, not impossible.

Let me return to the two AIHRC reports, and place the differing tactics into the current context.  Part of NATO’s “sales pitch”, and remember that they are selling an “unfamiliar product”, includes air strikes and night raids.  Now, if one was building a Lehrer-esque TV commercial for this, the ad copy would go something like this

“Liberal-Democracy is your friend!  It will free you from the annoying pain of barbarism and unproductive labour, giving you freedom to buy whatever you wish.  Warning, Liberal-Democracy has been know to have occassional side effects including indiscriminate bombings of weddings and deadly insults to your family honour.  Always consult a Political Scientist before applying Liberal-Democracy, and let them know if you are using any other ideologies.  In a few cases, Liberal-Democracy has been known to interact poorly with Islamic belief leading to riots, indiscriminate killings and ghettoization.”

Now, the competing Taliban ad copy might read like this

“Submission is your friend!  It frees you from the annoyance of having to think and the pain of individual freedom.  Gain assurance and stability in your life, with the Taliban®!  Warning, application of Taliban® governance may lead to unavoidable purging of families, clans and ethnic groups.  In rare cases, Taliban® has been know to lead to a severe reaction necessitating the quarantining of entire genders or the destruction of world heritage sites.  Always consult a Taliban® approved mulla before use, and never use Taliban® with any other ideologies as this may lead to side effects such as public stonings and/or beheadings.”

A large part of the current Taliban “marketing” campaign is based on the rather odd (to our eyes) argument that “you know we might kill you, but at least we will do aim it at specific individuals.  NATO, on the other hand, will insult and kill you randomly.”  In the truly warped emotional logic so beloved of many humans, this translate to “we [the Taliban] will always tell you the Truth, while they will lie – who are you going to trust?”

Building trust

People often seem to assume that “trust” is something absolute.  It isn’t, really, it is relative – at least in the sense that what most people mean by saying they “trust” someone is that they trust them to act in a specific manner.  “Trust” is the emotional side of predictability.

Now, I would suggest that most of the Afghan people “trust” the Taliban (with or without the ® symbol) to act in a very transparent and highly predictable manner.  If, for example, they say in a night letter that they will kidnap and execute someone, they probably will if their conditions are not met.

What about “trusting” the NATO forces?  Based on the AIHRC report, I would suggest that the overall level of “trust” is dropping.  Most Afghans would, I assume, know from experience that if they act or speak in certain manners, then the Taliban will go after them.  But this does not appear to be the popular perception when it comes to the NATO forces who might well just bomb your village (or wedding) or break into your house at night with “no” provocation.

Indeed, the Taliban “marketing department” has done immensely well.  One might almost suspect that they have outsourced their market research to Al Qaeda’s Imperial Terrain System!

I want to return to part of the quote that I started this entry with

In cases of night raids and other ground operations, international military forces’ lack of expertise and familiarity with Afghan culture and local tradition have often led them to unnecessarily offend and traumatize local communities.

To my mind, this is right on target and one of the main reasons why I support the concept of the Human Terrain System (even though I have queries about the actuality of the program).  Now, I think it is important to note that this has nothing to do with whether or not I “support” the current conflict; I am talking about a “given that there is a current conflict, what should we do about winning it” situation.  Or, in other words, I am focusing on a strategic problem within a current conflict rather than a grand strategic problem of the current conflict.

Back to “…Afghan culture and local tradition”…

Any market researcher, at least any good one (and I know some of the best) will tell you that you absolutely must learn how the local culture interprets and perceives your “product”.  The same holds true in asymmetric warfare – you have to understand the local population in order to tailor your tactics to shift their perceptions in your favour.  You must create a situation of predictability, in terms of actions leading to consequences, that is understood and accepted by the local population; that is the basis of “trust” in this type of conflict.

If you fail to establish this base level of “trust”, then they will never “buy” the rest of the package and, if they don’t “buy” it, there are certain highly probable consequences.  First, we will start seeing more of the “last resort” type of thinking (actually, a perceptual reversion to a trained “natural attitude”) that is causing many of the current problems.

Second, that type of “last resort” thinking has an extremely dangerous set of side effects on the people who get caught up in it.  Without going into details, it basically creates a psychotic break with reality, where people perform the same actions over and over again even though they never “work” (i.e. achieve the desired result).  This is bad enough for the individuals who are caught in this type of psychotic feedback loop, but it can easily be worse for the other people around them – for an extreme example of the effects of this type of thinking, take a look at Germany during the last 100 days or so of Hitler’s regime.

Third, this type of thinking will inevitably lead to losing the Afghan conflict and a victory for the Taliban® “brand”.  This isn’t the Coke – Pepsi “Wars” we are talking about here; this is an armed conflict with millions of people involved.  A Taliban “victory” would, in all probability, embolden other psychotic revitalization movements worldwide and lead to even more global destabilization.

So, to Brig.-Gen. Denis Thompson, I would respectfully suggest that you beg, borrow or steal an HTT (or even, the Dutch “poor man’s” version) and start rethinking your tactics in light of the strategic necessities.

Category: COIN
Tags: Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission, Afghanistan, Asymmetric warfare, COIN