A few reflections on Wanat
Posted By Marc on February 10, 2009
Tom Ricks has a series of posts on the Battle of Wanat last summer over at Foreign Policy that is well worth reading for a number of reasons. First of all, Tom has done some excellent research and, unlike many, offers questions rather than answers (although he has a few of those). Second, his research, including a large number of quotes and sourceable material, is focused on the micro-level; a small unit action (there was only a platoon at Wanat).
I wanted to pick up on one question Tom asked that, I think, starts to get to the heart of many of the current issues I see with the Afghan COIN campaign, what he calls
the ongoing, long-running confusion between a counterterrorism mission and a counterinsurgency one. How do the two fit together?
Let me start trying to untangle this by making a simple observation: terrorism is a tactic while insurgency is a political process and political label. “Terrorist” tactics are not inherently political in and of themselves, although they may be motivated and justified by political rhetoric (NB: I am using the term “politics” and “political” to refer to any symbol system that defines “right and proper” social organization; the symbol system may be “Political”, “Religious”, “Cultural”, etc.). Insurgencies, however, are inherently political and may make use of any tactics. Counterinsurgency (COIN) and counterterrorism are not operating in the same “level of reality”, and this makes fitting them together extremely difficult.
One of the greatest proponents of “terrorist” tactics was probably GEN Curtis LeMay. Consider, by way of example, his famous Stone Age quote
they’ve [North Vietnam] got to draw in their horns and stop their aggression, or we’re going to bomb them back into the Stone Age.
In terms of rhetorical structure, LeMay’s comment is the same as many made by Osama bin Ladin and other terrorists: a “do what we tell you or die horribly” statement. Now, this type of comment is qualitatively different from the “do what we want or we will bear the tar out of you” rhetoric that precedes conventional wars (in most cases, regardless of what that convention is) and is the basis of most insurgencies.
Symbolic Inversion and Compaction
Let me get back to that phrase I used earlier: “level of reality”. This is actually a reference to the operation of symbol systems. In the case of insurgencies, what we are dealing with is a redefinition of current “political” practice based on either a) a change in emphasis within a symbol system, or b) the replacement of one symbol system by another. The justification of terrorist tactics, however, usually does not involve a mere “change in emphasis” – most of the time it involves the inversion or compaction of a symbolic association chain.
Let me give an example of this. In the 15th century, “witches” were stiull goverened (loosely) under the dictates of the canon episcopi which defined them as “insane” or “deluded”. As such, they could not legally be charged under canon law since they were not Christians. The symbolic inversion was completed with the Malleus Malleficarum by defining witches as worshipers of Satan, and Satan as a key member of the Christian universe of discourse. Since witches worshipped Satan, they were, by the syphalitic insights of the authors of the Malleus, Christian heretics and, hence, subject to canon law first (as opposed to civil law). This inversion allowed for the extension of witchcraft accusations to a much greater “public”, making them a tool of political faction fights. Since the initial court was now under canon law, different rules of evidence applied (much looser) and a conviction in a Church court was taken with full faith from a secular court which merely carried out a sentence. By the mid-17th century, the symbolic chain had compacted so far that the Roman Church at least was trying to stop it and return to the pre-Malleus days (cf Carlo Ginzburg, The Night Battles
There was a reason for this attempt to unpack the symbolic chain and return to pre-Malleus days, one that had little to do with “theology” (loosely construed) and everything to do with personal and organizational survival. In the late 16th century, changes were already evident in the Spanish Inquisition (cf Gustav Henningsen, The Witches’ Advocate
The mind is its own place, and in it self
Can make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n.
What matter where, if I be still the same,
And what I should be, all but less then hee
Whom Thunder hath made greater? Here at least
We shall be free; th’ Almighty hath not built
Here for his envy, will not drive us hence:
Here we may reign secure, and in my choyce
To reign is worth ambition though in Hell:
Better to reign in Hell, then serve in Heav’n.
I did not choose this example lightly – I believe that it has serious lessons for us in Afghanistan, lessons that have not, as Tom noted in his posts, been internalized.
The map is / is not the territory
It is an interesting case to study especially because of the discrepancy between what is known about the incident and what has been learned from it. In other words, the facts gathered by Col. Mark Johnstone in the Army investigation are compelling, but the conclusions drawn from those facts are not. Rather, the Army appears determined to shy away from the lessons indicated by those facts. Here is what the Army concluded — basically that we did OK, we should have had a Predator overhead, and that we shouldn’t have trusted those lousy Afghans.
As with many organizations based on a nomonological-deductive meta-epistemology, the US Army suffers from an increasing disjuncture between those on the front lines and those who are insulated by those front lines. This problem is not, by any means restricted to the military; it is endemic in many organizations, directly related to the organization construction of perceptions and, most importantly, individual selection criteria within an organization (cf Nuala Beck, Shifting Gears
Put simply, an organization will invest resources in constructing a “map” of “reality” and bringing that organizations’ policies and proceedures in line with that map. This investment is quite costly, both for the organization as a whole and for the individuals associated with it (in terms of prestige, status, legitimacy and differential access to resources). Over time, this map “hardens” in peoples’ perceptions, becoming reality for them. It operates in the classic manner, outlined by Thos. Kuhn
Back in the late 1970′s, KLM suffered from this problem: they confused their organization map for the territory they were serving and, as a result, were loosing market share. Their solution was simple: put executives in a position where they were front line staff and let enlightened self interest operate. The result was the elimination of roughly 2/3rds of corporate regulations and an increased empowerment of front-line workers. We are actually starting to see something similar show up in the US Army, slowly, but we have yet to see CPTs acting as Corporals, which may account for some of the problems noted by Ricks.
Let me leave the US Army for a minute and turn to what may happen with organizations that predicate their mapping conventions on fear and the tactics of terrorism. I was originally planning on writing an analysis of this, but I just received the latest Special Dispatch from MEMRI with excerpts and translations of recent interviews with Iraqi MP Iyad Jamal Al-Din who does a much better job than I could.
Iyad Jamal Al-Din: “The Islamic movement that rules in Iraq lives in the past – especially the political forces that raise the banner of the martyrs, and base themselves on a history of being oppressed, without taking into consideration the bright future.
“The Iraqi people is a living people. It chooses life over death. The religious discourse in Iraq sanctifies death, the dead, and the martyrs, who are viewed as a cultural asset. This discourse does not sanctify the living. If you want to be sanctified, to become immortal, you must first be killed. This runs counter to the will and aspirations of the Iraqi public.
“It is also noteworthy that the religious forces ruling Iraq formed a coalition out of fear, not love. They are afraid of the ‘other’ – sometimes this ‘other’ is secular, other times Sunni, and sometimes… the ‘other.’”
Interviewer: “Even though they are the rulers.”
Iyad Jamal Al-Din: “Yes. They did not become close out of love. They do not share any friendship and do not agree on joint political principles. The only thing they share is fear of the ‘other,’ and if there is no such ‘other,’ they create one in their imagination, in order to intimidate their followers and become close to one another.”
Brilliant. Of course, I have always had a soft spot for poetic language.
So what?
What does the observations by Iyad Jamal Al-Din have to do with the US Army and what it should learn from the Battle of Wanat?
First, and most crucial, is that the US Army cannot afford to distance itself from the Afghan population. This is not because current COIN doctrine is population centric; that falls right back into a confusion of the map for the territory. Current COIN doctrine is population centric because, at this point in time and space,
- that is the most effective representation of a workable operational reality for achieving mission success, and
- given that the mission will go ahead, it is the least damaging to the souls of those fighting on all sides, as well as those caught in the middle.
This second point needs to be expanded. Put simply, war/conflict increases the likelihood of damage to the souls (and bodies) of all caught in it (the psyches is you prefer the secular version, although you might want to check out the root meaning of the term…). This damage is increased by converting the “Other” into an object that is not human in ones own mind. Once this process is lodged in the perception, it is easy to extend it to any group with which you might, currently, have a disagreement: like a slow moving acid, it gradually eats away at ones ability to empathise with anyone living. Nowadays, we call such people sociopaths, and they form the bulk of modern serial killers.
Second, the slippery slope to sociopathy is encouraged by certain organizational structures that dissociate the individual from the “front lines”. Probably the best known example is the NAZI Party, but I would suggest that there are many other, more current, examples (I promised myself I wouldn’t mention the Financial Services sector, so I won’t). Organizations that reward sociopathic behaviour by providing positive reinforcement for that behaviour bear a collective responsibility for that behaviour.
In his penultimate post, Tom notes
The Army attitude was crystallized in its responses to a congressional inquiry on Wanat. Sen. Inouye’s office asked how it came to pass that a platoon was sent into a light, remote, ill-prepared position, without overhead surveillance or observation posts, when there were indications of a large Taliban band operating in the area. The Army’s answer is non-responsive: It explains why the move was made, rather than how it was made.
I’ve been told lately that the Army’s Infantry Center has conducted its own “after action review” of the Wanat battle, including a new series of interviews with soldiers from the unit. (Is it significant that they decided not to rely on the 15-6 report? I don’t know.) I am glad this was done. I’d be interested in reading that review, if anyone has a copy.
By the way, I think it is just a coincidence, but I’ve also learned in the last few days that the Army IG has been directed to look into Wanat.
I’d be interested in reading that review as well.
ps. There is a very interesting discussion over at Abu Muqawama on this as well, especially in the comments section
Marc on 
Pascale Siegel on 
JWC on 
Daniel Gallant on 
MM on
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