In Harmonium

Posted By Marc on February 21, 2009

Last Thursday (Feb. 19th, 2009), Inside Higher Ed published an article by Dr. Adam Silverman called The Why and How of Human Terrain Teams.  This piece, which is well worth reading, is one of the few that has come out by an HTT member describing their actions in the field – it also “enjoys” comments by Max Forte and Roberto Gonzalez amongst others.  I’m not going to talk about most of the piece, but there is one strand that I want to pull out: the relationship between information, intelligence and ethics.  This relationship, and it is quite complex and problematic, shows up in a part of the article and in some of the comments.

The data

We do not do targeting, intelligence collection, or engage in any part of lethal and kinetic operations, although we do, like everyone, retain the right to self-defense. Contrary to the program’s most vocal critics, we are not using social science methodology to enable the Army to kill more Iraqis and Afghanis.

Adam Silverman

Dr. Silverman argues that human terrain teams do not collect intelligence. Yet by the US Army’s own standards, his team was doing doing precisely that. According to US Army Field Manual 2-0 Intelligence, “human intelligence” or HUMINT is defined in the following way: “foreign information from people and multimedia to identify elements, intentions, composition, strength, dispositions. . .It uses human sources as a tool and a variety of collection methods, both passively and actively, to gather information to satisfy the commander’s intelligence requirements and cross-cue other intelligence disciplines.” Why does Dr. Silverman insist on accusing critics of being unfamiliar with military terminology when his own understanding of basic terms is clearly deficient?
Comment by Roberto Gonzalez

So, if I understand Dr. Gonzalez correctly, virtually all information is intelligence? So, by definition, Human Terrain folk are doing intelligence?! Well, then everything Dr. Gonzalez does is intelligence. Are we all spies? Might any book, article, or monography be snapped up by the Army to oppress the masses of some poor country?

Sorry. That line of logic doesn’t even pass the laugh test.
Comment by Matthias

Keep laughing, Matthias. Everything is indeed intelligence. Else, it wouldn’t be very intelligent.

As a former Army intelligence analyst, I learned first-hand that about three-quarters of actionable intelligence used in combat is possible only with a backdrop of “open-source” material.

Loose ships [sic] do sink ships — and possibly deny one the use of Predator-launching bases in Pakistan, courtesy of Senator Diane Feinstein.
Comment by DFS

What we have in this series of quotes is a very serious semantic confusion, compounded by what can only be described as a psychotic delusion.  I use the adjective “psychotic” advisedly and in its strict sense:

Psychosis (from the Greek ψυχή “psyche”, for mind or soul, and -οσις “-osis”, for abnormal condition), with adjective psychotic, literally means abnormal condition of the mind, and is a generic psychiatric term for a mental state often described as involving a “loss of contact with reality”. People suffering from psychosis are said to be psychotic.
Source: Wikipedia

Semantic confusion

Let us start with the semantic confusion.  The terms “information” and “intelligence” are used in these quotes in subtly different, and yet highly related, ways.  Let me start with the term “intelligence”.  “Intelligence”, as it is used by the military, refers to a form sensory input about the Operational Environment (OE) that is evaluated and translated such that a military commander can a) understand it, and b) choose a course of action.  Given this understanding of the term,  DFS is quite correct – everything is intelligence – at least potentially.

Within the military, possibly as a result of all the organizational tinkering done in the 1940′s and 50′s with the popularity of Operations Research and Cybernetic theory, “intelligence” is categorized, in part, by collection method (e.g. HUMINT [HUMan INTelligence], SIGINT [SIGnals INTelligence], ELINT [ELectronic or ELectro-magnnetic INTelligence], etc.: an analog of human senses).  “Intelligence” is the processed, pseudo-sensory data, that a military commander uses to make a decision.  In this sense, “intelligence” is (potentially), for that commander, “information” in the sense of a difference that makes a difference (Bateson’s definition of information).

Let’s now turn to the term “information”.  Often, the term “information” conflates three processes: the “sensing” of the environment, the pre-processing of that sensory data and the ascription of “meaning” to that partially raw, partially processed sensory data.  Let’s look at each of these separately.

• sensing the environment:  this refers to the action of “absorbing” or collecting limited data about the environment, including any actors within it.  I use the term “limited” advisedly, since it is impossible for any individual or group to collect the sum totality of every piece of data presented in an environment.  What we select, our data selection bias if you will, is conditioned in part by our sensory limits and in part by what our mental (and perceptual) models define as “data”.
• pre-processing the sensory data:  in humans, and most other species we know of, this processing is done in neural strata between the input layers from the sensory organs and the neo-cortex (sometimes it totally bypasses the neo-cortex).  Put simple, this “pre-” or “partial” processing sets thresholds for what sensory data will be relayed to the conscious mind.  For example, most people “tune out” common (for them) background “noise”.  This pre-processing is both learned and learnable in the sense that people can “adapt” to a new sensory environment fairly quickly with totally new sensory pre-processing “definitions” of what is and is not “important” (i.e. it does or does not make a difference currently).
• ascriptions of meaning:  only sensory data that is not “weeded out” as “unimportant” gets sent to the consious mind (NB: this is assuming we are talking about a non-reflexive state of consciousness; the material can, actually, be easily accessed via a whole series of techniques).  Now, in a new (to the individual) environment, the brain and mind do not “know” what is and is not “important”, so an incredible amount of partially processed data gets sent to the conscious mind for a decision.  As an example, think about how long it takes people, and how much sensory data they have to use, when they are learning how to tie their shoes or any other new skill.  After a period of time, however, people adapt to the “new” environment: they “know” what differences make a difference, so the amount of pre-processed sensory data sent to the conscious mind decreases.  What is happening during this period of time is that the brain (the wetware) is being “trained” to recognize new patterns, and recognize which environmental events make a difference, i.e. that meaningful “meanings” can be attached to sensory data.

Part of the reason why the term “information” tends to conflate these three (or more if one includes “learning”) processes has to do a very simple fact: information is only information if it is communicated.  Indeed, the three processes I described above are actually a process of communications from the environment to the conscious mind of an individual.  But the communication of information does not always stop with the conscious minds of individuals, it is often sent, as sensory data via a variety of media, to other individuals.

Once individually processed sensory data, “information”, is sent to other individuals it becomes sensory data for them to process and ascribe meaning to.  Now, part of the ascription of meaning includes the potential for action (such as communicating it to others, etc.) for either that new individual or for a group of which they are a part.  If the information is conveyed to a group, then it will be processed by the members of that groups using some common frame of reference (e.g. “professional knowledge” in the sense defined by Abbott). This is the precise phase that Silverman is locating the role of an HTT in – the communication of information and a shaping of the potential for action of the group (i.e. the military unit). As Silverman notes:

In a nutshell, we are using our methodological skills to help the Army learn how to achieve their goals without having to use force.

Claims-making

In effect, he is arguing that the role of the HTT is to shift the groups’ professional knowledge system to emphasize non-kinetic options.  This placement becomes the basis for his later moral claims

Regardless of your politics regarding the war, if one has the skills and knowledge to help out, even a little bit, and one chooses not to, what does that say about that individual or organization? This is the question that the many academics who have found it easy to criticize the Human Terrain System, either from ignorance, misinformation, or political opposition to the policy decisions that led us into the war in Iraq, need to ask themselves.

As with many claims making activities, Silvermans’ claim operates on certain assumed grounds and warrants (cf Joel Best, Rhetoric in Claims-Making), three of which are of particular importance:

1. the wars exists and will continue with or without intervention from social scientists (a claim about “reality”),
2. social scientists have the capability and duty to “help” reduce harm (a claim of capability), and
3. not “helping” is morally reprehensible (a claim based on the “common good”, analogous to doctors should help victims of an accident, people should give charity, etc.)

These claims are not accepted by either Max Forte (whose comments I will come back to later) or by Roberto Gonzalez.  Gonzalez responds

This commentary’s conclusion is symptomatic of the weak logic characteristic of HTS’s boosters. The author implies that the only legitimate way for social scientists “to help out, even a little bit,” in Iraq and Afghanistan is to join HTS or other counterinsurgency efforts. He seems unable to contemplate the possibility that a more effective role for social scientists concerned about the continuing loss of Iraqi, Afghan, and American lives would be to demand an end to these wars of occupation. As one scandal after another plagues HTS, this piece has the appearance of a feeble attempt at touching up the sullied image of a failed program.

Gonzalez’ response relies on the same  grounds and warrants; all that differs is the locus of harm (i.e. the perception of the situationally defined root of “harm”) and the definition of “intervention by social scientists”.  This locus of harm is the crucial difference between the two positions: Silverman views it as originating in the professional knowledge of the military, while Gonzalez views it as originating with the existence of the wars.  Once this difference, and yes, it IS a difference that makes a difference, is taken into account, the radically differing “conclusions” (actually claims for action) between the two follow quite logically.

In his article, Silverman has identified certain actions taken by his HTT that have reduced harm, and he promises that “[t]he results” of at least some of his work,  “are being prepared for peer review and publication.”  I see little reason to question these claims since at least some of them will be testable in the future (although I still believe that the HTS requires a program review [see here and here] so that we can get a better picture of it as a whole).  If Silverman’s claims about the effectiveness of his HTTs interventions are accurate, then we can conclude that intervention at the locus of harm he uses (i.e. the professional knowledge of the military) is having some effect in actually reducing harm.  We can also conclude that he is at least somewhat correct in his claim that intervention by social scientists at this locus of harm is possible.

The same, however, cannot be said about Gonzalez’ claim for interventional effectivness.  Certainly, the harm produced by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq would not have taken place (at least in those forms) without the wars themselves.  Whether or not the Taliban and Saddam Hussein would have committed similar levels of harm is a moot point; we will never know for certain.  Would a unilateral withdrawl from Afghanistan and Iraq lead to a reduction in harm?  Again, we cannot know without trying it and finding out (my suspicion is no, but that is untestable).  Gonzalez argues that “a more effective role for social scientists concerned about the continuing loss of Iraqi, Afghan, and American lives would be to demand an end to these wars of occupation”.  I must admit to being intrigued by how he defines “effective”?  Does he truly believe that if all the members of the AAA demostrated in front of the White House that both wars would end, or is the “effectiveness” measured solely by the making of the demand; a “feel good” measure on a par with donating to a “good cause”?

Clearly, Silverman’s claims for effectiveness can be tested, although they still need to be, while Gonzalez’ cannot.  The AAA recently revised their code of ethics to state that

In conducting and publishing their research, or otherwise disseminating their research results, anthropological researchers ensure that they do not harm the safety, dignity, or privacy of the people with whom they work, conduct research, or perform other professional activities, or who might reasonably be thought to be affected by their research.

In light of this, one must wonder which conclusion is more ethical given the relative disparity in testability.

The psychotic delusion in the debate

I mentioned earlier that the semantic confusion was compounded by a psychotic delusion; “a loss of contact with reality” as it were.  This delusion is rooted in the basic assumption that communicated information will not be used as intelligence.  In a number of different posts, Max Forte has examined this assumption and found it to be totally baseless – the military will use anything that they feel is appropriate (see, for example, here, here and here).  Max notes that his original “a ha” experience came out of a discussion with Owen Wiltshire, where Owen noted that

I would say your argument is against ethnographic scholarship and less against OA [Open Access]. Where else are you going to publish or hide it that would keep it “safe”? [ie the military has no trouble breaking our standard 128 bit encryption, so keeping it hidden on your hard drive isn't going to work either].

I said I would return to Max’ comments on Silverman’s article, and I will do so now.  The crucial comment, at least as I see it although I’m sure Max will correct me , is

I would have argued that if anthropologists want to help out the Iraqis, that they actually do so by helping actual Iraqis, not the foreign invaders who have demolished the country that they now claim to want “stabilized.”

Max’s comment focuses at a totally different locus of action, the “Iraqi’s”.  I am making some assumptions here, but I assume that he is referring to actions that are taken to reduce harm that are a) not conducted by any military organization, and that b) are focused on helping the Iraqi people at the local level.  Or, in other words, the same focal point as many NGOs operate on.

If this is the case, then such actions are testable and the effects of such actions are probabilistically predictable (i.e. there is enough data from similar operations to produce a decent statistical model that would allow one to be reasonably sure of the effects).  Furthermore, if the reports of such action are limited (read: censored for personal information, standard practice with requests for anonymity), then the potential for second order “harm” are limited, although not reduced to zero (I will return to this in a minute).

Let me go back to the psychotic delusion of thinking that information will not be used for intelligence purposes.  A corrolary of this delusion is the belief that only the (US) military (or their “neo-imperialist” allies in the UK, Canada and Australia) would use such information.  Once such information is communicated, then it can be used by anyone.  Believing that it is only the US military that would use such information is not only delusional, it is also paranoid (i.e. assigning the military to the role of the source of all evil) and shows an extreme degree of hubris.  After all, if only the US military (and their coalition allies) would use this information as intelligence, everyone else cannot harm you or, in other words, you are better than “Them”.

A couple of comments on risk

All claims-making calls for action contain claims about the risk of the action called for (source, scope, risks of inaction, etc.).  Of the three looked at, the lowest general risk is Max’s position (if my assumptions about it are correct).  The next lowest risk, again at the general level, is with Silverman’s claims, while the highest level of risk is with Gonzalez’ claims.

These relative risk assessments are based on two sets of data: first, what data for each type of action do we have historically, and second, what is the overall size of the population effected.  In Max’s case, we have a lot of data from all over the world, and the size of population effected is relatively small.  In Silverman’s case, we have less data (although a lot more that is generally talked about), and the population size is larger.  In Gonzalez’ case, we have extremely limited data, and a very large population effected.

There is another source of risk that has little to do with the specific calls for action, but everything to do with whether or not a claim incorporates the delusion that information will not be used as intelligence or its corollary that it would only be used by the US military.  This risk can be simply stated as what is the probability that what you communicate will be used by anyone to cause harm (this is implicit in the category of “who might reasonably be thought to be affected by their research” mentioned in the AAA code)?  For example, given that Gonzalez’ proposal has the highest level of risk, what is the likelihood that his arguments will be used by the Taliban (or Al Queda, Iran, etc.) as the basis for a PSYOPS (PSYcological OPerationS) campaign against the American people (NB: a similar campaign was conducted by the North Vietnamese using Jane Fonda)?

Some concluding remarks

Much of the debate surrounding social scientists in general and Anthropologists in particular working with the military is clouded in semantic confusion and, in some case, with outright psychotic delusions.  Despite the fact that this particular post only deals with a tiny part of the social science side of it, similar confusions and delusions are also apparent on the military side and, most definitely, with many of the contractors.

I believe that some of this confusion stems from a lack of shared communicative frameworks, a lack that is enhanced and strengthened by the very proceeses of social organization to which we are subject at this time (see here for one example).  Despite this, I truly believe that it is quite possible for shared frameworks to be created and used.  This does not mean that we will all agree, it just means that we will be able to identify where we disagree more precisely and, possibly, come to some ways of resolving those disagreements.

Category: Epistemology, Ethics, Human Terrain System (HTS), Information Operations
Tags: Human Terrain System (HTS), Information, Intelligence