Towards a working ontology of “Terrorism”
Posted By Marc on May 1, 2009
A couple of friends / colleagues are in the process of putting together an historical sourcebook on “terrorism” which, IMO, will be very useful. As a part of this process, I just got a copy of their draft introduction which has started me thinking that it is time to formalize some of my current thinking if I am going to make editorial comments.
“Terrorism” is a tactic
Let me start with a very basic observation: “terrorism” is a tactic, not a “thing”. Indeed, the defining criterion for “terrorism” is “actions that induce terror in a target population”. Now, rather than creating a list of actions that could / would do so, it is more profitable, from an analytic standpoint, to define the relationship involved.
So, we have a relationship between two “groups”, let’s call them X and Y, where X and Y have multiple modes of interacting. Within these modes of interaction, one (or more) forms of action are assumed by X to induce terror in Y, and one (or more) forms of action may induce terror in Y. I am being somewhat vague here because I am trying to capture someting that is very basic from communications theory, which is that “terrorism” is a form of communications – specifically, it is a “message” designed to induce an aversive response to an action (an attempt at Behaviouralist conditioning).
But, as anyone who has studied communications (or raised a child, or owned pets, etc.) knows, “messages” are not always interpreted by the receiver in the manner the sender wishes. The interpretation of messages relies on the ontology of the receiver rather than that of the sender (which is also one of the reasons why IO campaigns across cultures are problematic).
Ontologies of terror
“Terror” is an “emotion”; more specifically, it is an activation of the “flight” response in the human brain, often coupled with perceptions that bypass the “logical mind” (i.e. the neo-cortex). As such, it is highly related to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or, as my Godfather used to call it, Shell Shock. As a tactic, “terrorism” by a group aims to produce, at a population level, an unthinking aversion to particular actions rather than “terror” in any specific individual (we tend to use the term “abuse” to refer to individual level terrorist tactics which is probably an error).
As I noted earlier, the interpretation of a message relies on the ontology of the receiver rather than that of the sender, and this is a crucial point. It means that certain forms of communications may well be perceived as a form of “terrorism” because they attack a deeply held belief or perception, part of the target groups “ground of being”. Such an ontological “assault” may well induce “terror” in a target population where it was not intended, causing an “extreme” reaction, according to the senders ontology, that is completely beyond the “rational” (again, using the senders ontology of rationality).
Now, most of the time when we talk about “terrorism” these days, the examples are from radical Islamist irhabi. Let’s leave that particular PC fad behind, and talk about a different example: “pro-life” vs. “pro-choice”. Anyone with two neurons to rub together should realize that these two “positions” are actually constructed a) at different “levels” and b) based on different ontologies.
The “pro-life” (so-called) position assumes a sacrality of “life” (narrowly defined) that is absolute. Within this position, and especially in its more extreme forms, state sanction or supported abortion is anathema, literally it is the murder of unborn children. This is the “narrowness” I referred to earlier; few “pro-life” groups show any concern with children after they are born, although there are some exceptions. The “narrowness” has also extended to a position that, in a few cases, has adopted part of the “pro-choice” ontological position. In particular, if one chooses to be involved with abortions, then one has become the antithesis of “life” and, therefore, is no longer “alive”. They are, for some of the extremists, a form of “anti-life” that is a completely legitimate target for killing (not “murder”; cf Wikepedia for some examples).
On the flip side, the “pro-choice” position argues that individuals should have a choice as to whether or not they have an abortion. Despite the often vituperous rhetoric of the “debate”, the central point – choice – is still apparent in that there are still people who hold the position who are morally opposed to abortion. This is a much more inclusive ontology that the so-called “pro-life” position in that it actually incorporates that position as one of its options (this is what I meant by the two positions operate at different “levels”). The core “sacrality” is not of “life” (narrowly defined) but of “quality of life” (broadly defined).
I have used the term “sacrality”, but I could have also used other terms such as ground of being or axiomatic assumption. What is critical form my point here, however, is that all ontologies hold one or more perceptions as “sacred” (in the Durkheimian sense), and that “attacks” (kinetic or otherwise) on that sacrality will be perceived as if they were attacks on the individual. And, if that perception bypasses the rational mind of some members of the target group, those attacks will be “terrorist” attacks for that target group.
Perception and proportionality
One of the more intriguing things about us as a species is that we tend to “default” to certain types of relationships. In this case, using Fiske‘s terminology, we see a default to an Equality Matching relationship (“Reciprocity” for us old style Anthro types). In this relationship, the response by a group to an action is in direct proportion to the perception of that action. This final point is crucial – the response is based on the perception of the receiver, not the intention of the sender.
Now, if humans were a totally rational species, which we aren’t at all, such an argument would fall into the “blame the victim” type. It isn’t. As a species, we have our share of psychotic beliefs (and individuals!), and we certainly have a large number of both ego- and group-centric perceptual biases (part of our genetic makeup). This means that we can certainly count on someone, somewhere viewing any action by someone else as a “terrorist attack”. Indeed, the sheer existence of a group that holds diametrically opposed views on sacred issues is often enough to pre-condition perceptions (think the status of women issue Canada vs. the Taliban for an example).
Earlier, I used the terms “rational” and “rationality” and I wanted to pull that apart a bit more. Both terms are not absolutes; they are conditioned by the symbol system in which they are embedded. Despite certain philosopher’s passionate wishes, “rationality” is bounded and situational (as is “logic”) in both form and content. What this means, in this instance, is that what may be perfectly logical and rational to one group may be totally illogical and irrational to another (the PC term for this is “cross-cultural [mis-]communications”, but it extends well beyond “culture”).
Not only may the logic and rationality of a group be perceived by another group as “insane”, it may also be perceived as “insulting”, especially when the sacralities of the two groups are opposed. Such a statement, unfortunately, may be perceived as advocating the essentialist position of irreconcilable differences advocated by people like Huntington. I certainly do not mean to espouse that position, since it is, IMO, indefensible. What is important to realize is that communicative acts (including the act of existing), may well create unthinking reactions in other groups. These reactions, however, may be tempered and modified by either other groups or by other communicative acts that may modify the ontologies of the groups involved. Of course, it is also quite possible that they will not be modified and that the inter-group ontological competition will go “hot”. “That”, as my grandmother used to say, “is life.”
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I am glad to see that you are back and posting after what seems like a long break from blogging. Also, I like the site redesign.
I was just curious to know if for this handbook you would also be considering the aesthetics of “terrorism”. This struck me early on around 2003 and 2004, that the images being communicated were not “just the best we could do under these circumstances,” but deliberate constructions — negatives of kidnappers in ski masks, eyes flashing red or green, on a flaming background, the image set at a diagonal, like it was really meant to convey hell, and the intended victim sitting motionless at their feet, head down. I have not seen such images in years, so something tells me that the visual tactics are no longer favoured, for whatever reason. I thought they were extremely effective, on me.
Hi Max,
Thanks – I’ve been tied up on projects and getting ready for a European tour this summer, so my time has been insanely tight.
On the “aesthetics of terrorism” issue, personally I think it would be a good idea and I will certainly pass it on to the editors. The entire aesthetics issue issue, both presentations / representations of Self and Other really should be included and would, IMO, make a truly great study.
I really like the pro-life/choice approach to thinking about terrorism. I think you do a good job of describing the terror involved when a person’s worldview comes up against a challenge. I’m concerned, however, about maintaining a distinction between “terror” and “terrorism”.
Are you perhaps putting a little too much emphasis on the “receiver” side of things? I think the point you’re making is an interesting one, and perhaps I’m taking your argument farther than you intend, but it seems to me that situating “terrorism” within the ontological space of the receiver will obliterate any possible meaning the word could have. It seems like this model of looking at terrorism could find it in basic forms of debate or discussion (i.e. an earnest conversation about atheism might be terrifying for some).
I think some of the difficulty comes from the suggestion that terrorism can take place in a non-kinetic space. Usually when we think of terrorism we think of a kinetic activity eliciting a psychological response (kinetic -> non-kinetic), but you’re suggesting that terrorism can take place at the level of ideas (non-kinetic -> non-kinetic……I’m not counting “threats” here, because they are predicated on kinetic violence). I think this could be a slippery slope. While I do agree that the phenomenon you’ve identified exists, and would make a very interesting area of study, I hesitate to being it under the umbrella of “terrorism”
I think its best to try to circumscribe, as best as possible, the definitions of words that are as important, and have as much power, as terrorism. We don’t need to look farther than how the word “propaganda” is used in official discourse to see the danger of what happens when the ground comes out from under our language. “Propaganda” has becomes so devoid of operational meaning (a floating signifier if there ever was one), and efforts to interact with it politically run up against the (likely deliberate) vagueness of its definition. I think terrorism is too important a word to have its meaning compromised. The Communication model is a good one, I just think that criticism of postwar communications research’s focus on the sender sometimes gives too much conceptual autonomy to the receiver. Like everything, a center position is preferable.
Thoughts?
I think your model is good as well, though I have one “niggly” point about your (obviously necessary) over-simplification of the self-ascribed “pro-life” and “pro-choice” monickers.
I’ve not met many anti-abortion individuals who are actually “pro-all-life”. They tend to, as a group, make a distinction between “innocent, defenseless” life, and “other” life. Thus the way the death penalty for violent offenders tracks very closely to those who also oppose abortion.
And fetuses typify, to that group, the concept of “innocent, defenseless life”. Therefore there is a world of difference between someone who chooses to perform abortions and the subject OF the abortion. Under that world-view physically attacking an abortionist is an extremely logical “choice”. (If you’re pro-choice about one form of violence, why not ALL forms?)
Both sides have firm basis in biology, I believe: There is a very visceral desire for some individuals to ensure that females bring babies to term, and there is also a very visceral desire among others to keep females sexually receptive, and abortion helps serve that purpose.
(Tomcats in the barn will kill a litter of kittens so they will quit nursing and bring female cats back into heat. It’s not that big of a stretch to attribute the same motives to pro-abortionists.)
Have I mentioned recently how much I dislike the massaged names each name themselves? Pro- and Anti- abortion is a much more honest term.
Thanks for blogging again. Missed reading your blog entries.
Hi Jeff,
That’s certainly a valid concern. This is really a “think piece”, trying to lay out a process, rather than a static set of characteristics. For example, we may see situations of overlapping ontologies where there is no doubt that the “message” is aimed at producing terror. Let me think on this and get back to you later.
I like the ontological spin Marc puts on the communication involved in terrorism. It seems to me (perhaps simplistically) that terrorism is a form of communicaiton in which kinetic means are used to achieve psychological objectives. Moreover it is by filtering these kinetic means intentionally through the psychological dimenstion that the terrorist hopes to elicit a response that he/she would otherwise not be able to achieve through kinetic means alone. One issue in this model is the potential for miscommunication. We have examples in which a terrorist communication was understood in a completley different way by the recipient. The Beslan siege is an excellent exmpale. The Chechens intended to communmicate “negotiate with us for the release of our fighters” and the Russians perceived the message as “this is an existential threat to your credibility.” In other words, both the sneder and receiver need to have a clear idea not only of what they are trying to communicate but how ti will be perceived by the other side. To my mind, this is part of a larger issue around terrorism which is that of rules-based versus non rules-based action. In the political or social realm, terrorism could be understood as a violation of the laws of the state. In the militayr realm, it is a violation of the rules of war. In the ontological realm, it might be perceived as a violation of the rules of communicaiton. Those rules state that in any communication, you do not use violence to deliver your message. Thus, a heated debate about abortion, even if it attacks a recipient’s ontological position maybe seen as intimidation, but it does not becme “terrorism” until violence is introduced into the discussion. Moreover it is somehow contrary to the way in which we use the word terrorism that we should apply it to individual acitons. If during a heated discussion between two individuals, one of them throws a punch, I am not sure it conforms with common usage to call that terrorism. If, on the other hand, a government responds to a peaceful demonstration in favour of abortion with a police baton charge, we might consider that a form of state terrorism inasmuch as it has violated the rules at two levels (a) there are laws against the police beating up peaceful demonstrators, and (b) the intent is clearly to use psycholopgical intimidation to shut down any further communication. I do think that Marc’s comments about the ontological dmiension in communication open up a very promosing line of inquiry. It certianly deserves more attention.
Hi Drew,
Good to hear from you, too! You’re absolutely correct that I was over-simplifying the positions of both “sides”. I have actually met some people who are “pro-all-life” as you put it. Then again, we don’t have the death penalty in Canada any more, so it may be that once that is taken off the table at a social level, it becomes more “logical”. The distinction between “innocent, defenseless life” and “other life” is, I suspect, tied back into the older concept of the “deserving poor”; a religiously (or ideologically) justifiable way to classify people as worthy or unworthy of being members of an in-group.
And, BTW, you are quite right about both having a basis in biology. I can think of other examples as well, most of which have to do with the carrying capacity of a given environment.
Hi Jan,
Some good thoughts here. We may have to end up agreeing to disagree on whether or not terrorism can be conducted by an individual, but let me toss out a scenario at you. Let us suppose that a single individual threatens and intimidates another with the purpose of instilling terror in them. This could be the “standard” spousal abuse” scenario, or it could be a protection racket (or a manager in a firm, a kid on a school playground, etc.). This is a learned tactic of acquiring resources (both material and affective) that can be carried on in latter life and may, actually, be part of the cultural scripting.
Now, most cultures have some type of threatening behaviour as part of their cultural scripts. Consider, by way of example, the role / status of women about 150 years ago (or the recently re-imposed Shaia law in Afghanistan). I would argue that cultures are, to some extent, based on rules of negative reciprocity – a “do this or else” situation. Are these cultural scripts “terrorist”? Maybe, which is why I was looking at ontologies since meaning can be both ascribed and mutable.
I think that, as a line of inquiry, there is some potential in this if for no other reason than that it escapes the supposed paradox of “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter”.
So (he says rather tentatively) does that mean when the government says to “pay your taxes or go to jail, they are using “terrorist” tactics to get your money?
Maybe that explains the lack of due process in the tax enforcement system as well….
Hi Drew,
Well, it wasn’t an example I was going to use, what with tax time just past, but….
Actually, I think that it is an excellent example of what I was trying to get at when I was talking about how cultures will contain threatening scripts. There are other examples as well (Law Enforcement comes to mind). I don’t think that these are perceived as being terroristic, although we could look at the early days oof the American insurgency – say 1775-77 – when a number of them were certainly cast that way.
Well, it certainly would fit with the concept of established governments and insurgents being competing organisms.
But if you examine the positions of gov’t vs. “terrorist” (or insurgent who uses terrorism) it’s obvious that the “terrorist” threat is limiited in its actual scope, while the government threat is not. Terrorists very seldom exterminate millions of people, for instance, while governments can and will do so, under certain conditions.
Yet most people fear terrorists, yet few fear governments. So when addressing terror, the emotional effect trumps the actual?
“Yet most people fear terrorists, yet few fear governments. So when addressing terror, the emotional effect trumps the actual?”
In a word, yes. Let me note, however, that many people are not that terrified of their governments. The same cannot be said about other people’s governments. It’s certainly not as simple as “the” government. Again, part of this goes back to what the culture accepts as “normal”. We are also dealing with an in-group / out-group effect here along the lines of “my government may be bad, but I know it. Their government is just corrupt and power hungry!”.
Basically, it’s actual not “emotional”, it is the perception of some actor (or actions) that is designed to evoke emotions (the emotional connotation of the symbol). When we look at what “our” government may do, it is often “sold” to us using a completely different symbol set. For example, think back to the run up to the invasion of Iraq, and all of the play surrounding weapons of mass destruction. That was an attempt to not only rationally, according to Just War Theory, justify the invasion, it was also an attempt to instill terror in the minds of the international (and US) community. There was no discussion, and little thought as we both know , of the effects it would have on the Iraqi populace other than a vague “You’re free now”.
Regarding your emphasis on terrorism being about emotion, I’d suggest it’s even more about cognition, specifically about a cognitive layer (module?) in the mind that is about people’s orientations to social space, time, and action, in their most basic senses.
Strip away peoples’ values, ideologies, and other such beliefs, and what’s left before getting down to a quivering mess of emotions and instincts? It’s that layer about space-time-action orientations. It starts taking shape in early childhood, and it’s often bound up with the culture in which a person is raised.
As for terrorism, it’s mostly about fear and alarm — and fear and alarm are the emotional results from cognitions that one’s identity (in space) is threatened from almost any direction, one’s future (in time) is in immediate jeopardy, and there’s hardly anything one can do (in action) about this.
I’m a long ways from being able to be entirely clear about this, but I spotted your discussion and thought I’d field the idea. Onward.
Hi David,
Some very good points there. I tend to view emotions as being partly formed by perceptions and culture in that space-time-action layer you are talking about. As for causing fear and alarm, in general at the population level, I would tend to agree with you, although I will stand by my original point that the basic goal is “terror”, not just “fear” or apprehension.
I think you are exactly correct that the goal is that feeling / perception of powerlessness. One of the dangers of that, however – at least from the terrorists viewpoint, is that the target population will adapt to that situation; Israel being a good example of one type of adaptation.
One of the key danger I see in all of it is in that adaptation. When a society (or culture) gets put under a lot of stress, many of the members of that group tend to revert their thinking in time; i.e. their perceptions become increasingly present focused. This often, and especially if there is a “clear and present danger”, makes them susceptible to political manipulation; classic examples would be the rise of various revitalization movements, the 1913 creation of the US banking crisis, the rise of Hitler, etc.
Thanks for raising the points, I appreciate it!
Yes, space-time-action orientations (and attendant emotions) are the cognitive crossroads of how not only individuals but also societies as a whole react to terrorism.
In trying to deal with terrorism since 9/11, America’s purported values have remained steady: we fight for freedom, democracy. But there have been controversies about whether we Americans have the patience for the long haul, whether we feel a connection to far-away travails, whether we know where we are headed, whether we will eventually turn inward, and whether we can rise to the occasion. These concerns are all basically about space-time-action dispositions, even though they may be dressed up in language about philosophic values and norms. This appears to be the case in other places too.
Space-time-action orientations are involved in battlefield perceptions as well. For Americans, most conflicts take place in confined, distant areas. But the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington aroused radically different space-time-action concerns. Suddenly Americans felt they faced a stealthy enemy that might attack anywhere, anytime, with any awful means — an enemy that, because of its orientations, rejects futuristic Western ideas of progress and modernity, seeks to create an apocalyptic disaster for the West, brooks no separation between the sacred and secular realms, and lacks regard for the boundaries between life and death. These are all space-time-action dispositions.
Meanwhile, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, the United States has responded with modes of warfare that feature its own space-time-action innovations: no defined front, a quickening tempo of operations, pulsing strikes from all directions. In addition, perception management operations have tried to convince al-Qaeda and Taliban forces that time was not on their side and that they could not hide for long. Indeed, U.S. military doctrine is designed to erode an enemy’s space-time-action perceptions (or in John-Boydian language, to get inside their OODA loops).
In short, all sides in conflicts involving terrorism try to play havoc with each other’s space-time-action orientations. And as you point out, this can test a society’s resilience and adaptability. More terrorism induces more cognitive and emotional disorientation, and this can lead to the kinds of susceptibilities you began to elucidate. The likelihood of extreme reactions — say, in the form of millenarian movements — goes up if people feel they are being afflicted not just with “deprivation” but with utter “disaster.”
And if I needed another example…
http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/05/31/tiller-abortion.html