In Harmonium

Posted By Marc on September 21, 2009

With the release of an unclassified version of GEN McChrystal’s assessment (pdf; w/ hat tip to SWJ and the Washington Post) we can finally start to get a handle on the rationale behind the new (?) strategy for Afghanistan.  I have only skimmed the Assessment as yet, but several points jump out at me.  In particular, two sentences on page 1-1

The key takeaway from this assessment is the urgent need for a significant change to our strategy and the way we think and operate.

Finally, we must redefine the nature of the fight, clearly understand the impacts and importance of time, and change our operational culture.

Changes in strategy and operations

As predicted by many observers, the key strategic change is to move the campaign closer to the population-centric model of COIN.  No surprise there.  What is somewhat surprising, in that it is said at all, is this little quote (1-2)

However, progress is hundered by the dual threat of a resilient insurgency and a crisis of confidence in the government and the international coalition. To win their [the Afghan people's] support, we must protect the people from both of these threats.

Personally, I find it quite heartening that someone is at last stating that the GoA and ISAF are a “threat” to the Afghan people; it is about time.  Indeed, he goes far beyond the mere implication quoted above (p.2-4)

The weakness of state institutions, malign actions of power brokers, widespread corruption and abuse of power by various officials, and ISAF’s own errors, have given the Afghans little reason to support their government.

Much of the rest of the second section deals with specific ways to address key problems.

But is it a change in thought?

In some ways, the answer is yes.  For the past eight years, the war in Afghanistan can, and should, be described as a set of different wars loosely linked together and differing from AO to AO.  One of the key points made by GEN McChrystal is that all the different contingents must be co-ordinated, and that includes all of the ISAF militaries as well as civilians; the buzz phrase being “unity of effort”.

But here is where it gets to be “interesting” in the Chinese sense: unity of effort to what end and with what limits on means?  The assessment follows the now classic population-centric view of COIN operations, that being that while the military can loose the fight, only the politicians can win it.   That having been said, I have to wonder just which politicians are tasked with that mission and whether or not they will actually do it.

This is not meant as a snarky comment; I am quite serious about this.  Who is the political mission lead on the Afghan mission?  Is it President Karzai?  President Obama? Mullah Omar? (okay, the last was snarky, but he at least has a coherent commitment to his mission).

If you read the assessment carefully, and not only between the lines, there is a quality of “put up or shut up” to it regarding the political ends.  Someone from the political side has to stand up and act as the lead on this, and I really cannot see either President Karzai or President Obama doing so effectively.  President Karzai is hampered by various and sundry charges of corruption (rightly or wrongly made) as well as the recent kurfuffle over the last elections.  President Obama is responsible for the United States, not Afghanistan, and his focus will, quite rightly, be there.

So who is left?

Category: COIN
Tags: Afghanistan, GEN McChrystal