In Harmonium

Posted By Marc on January 28, 2010

In a recently released article in prospect magazine, Edward Luttwak argues that the US should adopt a “Byzantine” strategy in dealing with the Taliban.  His suggestion is simple

With Afghanistan, the west faces a simple strategic calculus: too costly to stay in, too risky to leave. A Byzantine response would be, first to withdraw the west’s scarce, expensive troops, and arm local proxies instead.

Having read somewhat of Byzantine society, I have to wonder about some of his characterizations of it.  For example, he notes that

Unlike the Romans, the Byzantines wrote official guidebooks on statecraft, foreign relations and espionage: writings I find especially fascinating, as I once helped compose the main field manual of the US army. These ancient techniques centred on a single, paradoxical principle: do everything possible to raise, equip and train the best possible army and navy; then do everything possible to use them as little as possible.

I do have to wonder if he has read Michael Psellus’ Fourteen Byzantine Rulers and, if he has, does he understand the social reasons why Byzantium followed a primarily diplomatic – espionage foreign policy?  There really isn’t much doubt why thier policy focused on espionage – diplomatic manipulation, the answer is simple: the bureaucratic faction in the Empire hated the military and did their best to destroy it.  “…raise, train and equip the best possible army and navy”?  Consider, by way of example, the annihilation of almost all Byzantine units and their replacement by mercenary troops after Basil II – and its inevitable consequence (hint) – at the instigation of that same bureaucratic faction.

There is no doubt that Byzantium does have a lot to offer in terms of insights.  One of the more intriguing examples is the rather amazing parallel between the development of encapsulated cultural knowledge for the military in both the modern, US forms and that shown in Maurice’s Strategikon, and the Office of Barbarians contains a blueprint of where the HTS might go in, say, 50 years.  Indeed, much of the current Tribal Engagement Strategy (see here for example) is very similar to standard Byzantine maneuvers.

There is just one, minor, difficulty with the US adopting Luttwak’s proposed version: they are Americans.  The Byzantine use of espionage – diplomacy fit in well with the realities of the Cold War and, indeed, much of the US grand strategy was based on it.  But we are not, now, living in that social environment and there is something in American culture that “dislikes” the “sneaky-ness” of this type of strategy.  Furthermore, this type of strategy won’t work for one simple reason – the international media.

Even before it could be implemented, it would be leaked and US credibility would suffer in the international arena.  Perhaps Luttwak believes that President Obama has the same ability to intimidate “barbarian” leaders as, say, Basil II but, if he believes that, he needs to rethink things.

Category: COIN
Tags: Afghanistan, Byzantium