Some more (!) HTS news…
Posted By Marc on February 15, 2010
John Stanton has posted a follow-up piece noting that the kidnapped social scientist, Issa Salomi, was living off base at the time of his abduction. According to John’s sources, this is not unique, and non-approved absences from base are, in some areas, “normal”. While John’s piece gives us more details, a much more damning piece was just published by David Price at Counterpunch (thanks to John for the link!) entitled Human Terrain Systems Dissenter Resigns, Tells Inside Story of Training’s Heart of Darkness.
With no apologies whatsoever, I have to say that the title of the story looks like it comes from the tabloids. The content, however, is another story entirely. Indeed, I commend David Price for writing an excellent piece in the best of the Boasian tradition; it is a reading that I will assign to students of mine.
Some people might wonder why I would recommend anything written by David Price since we disagree on many issues including the Human Terrain System. The answer is both simple and complex. The simple part first: it is an excellent example of how to write a compelling account of an interaction over time and, at the same time, it is one of the better, written, examples of using a “story” to teach a lesson. The complex answer is, of course, much more complex
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All “good” teaching stories bring the reader into an illusion of being “in” the story. This is true for good fiction, good ritual, and good ethnography. The story David tells is one of growing disillusionment with a training system that appears to operate more along the lines of a cult than a training system. That, BTW, is never said outright, although there are references to the Stockholm Syndrome, but it is obvious. What is particularly damning about the “beliefs” of this “cult”, at least as recorded in the story, is that it sounds a bit like an Opus Dei-esque (think Da Vinci Code), reactionary group against current US Army counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine.
Current COIN doctrine is, for want of a better phrase, somewhat “loose” in any number of areas, but it does have a core focus on regarding the population as the Centre of Gravity (CoG). The oft heard, albeit somewhat silly, phrase “Hearts and Minds” tries to capture this. This doesn’t mean that COIN doctrine advocates a “warm and fuzzy, let’s all join hands and try and contact the living” point of view; it doesn’t. What it primarily advocates is a two-fold approach of separating hard core, irreconcilable “insurgents” from the rest of the population while, at the same time, convincing the general population that it is in their best interests to support the government. It is also widely recognized amongst the COINdinistas that the military phase of a counter-insurgency operation can only buy time for a political solution.
This is where programs like the HTS have an immense value to play by making commanders on the ground understand what the locals “mean” by legitimacy, value, good governance, etc. For a program such as the HTS to be truly effective in the field, it needs to identify the environmental conditions and command actions necessary to set the stage for a political solution, and this is why the story David tells so well is so disturbing to me at least.
Read it yourselves, and see what you think.

The article is the same type screed we’ve seen from folks who will never be convinced. Nothing new or particularly profound. Probably plays well in academia; it’s a giggle from a military perspective
Contending that WESTON RESOLVE has any sinister intent gives way too much credit to folks who just haven’t demonstrated that degree of forethought. Cult like? It may appear that way to an academic. From a military perspective, the phrase that most aptly describes the project/program rhymes with “fluster cluck”.
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Well, let me just say that we (academics) recognize many types of “fluster clucks” . The cult-like component is actually a reference to the style of thought control used by a lot of cults in the 1970′s (don’t make me get the references….
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And, yes, part of my point was that it plays well not only in academia but outside the military in general. Is it a “giggle” from the military perspective? probably depends on who’s viewing it, since I have heard similar sentiments from 20 year vets who got jammed up in the HTS.
I am one of those 20 year vets who got jammed up in the HTS. I take the “cult” point insofar as there is a “group-think” within the HTS leadership that abhors criticism and lashes out rather than reflects.
From my point of view, the tone of the article (which several folks “strongly recommend”) is nothing new, breaks no new ground, and appears to desire to get in the required anti-military cheap shots.
I am quite vocal about the program’s shortcomings at every level (command, training, proponency, leadership, scope, focus, integration, etc). I am certainly not excusing the military’s approach here. In fact, I do not think HTS is at a stage yet where an outsider can fairly judge it’s effectiveness. From a purely military perspective, it is not ready for prime time. Their Mission Essential Task List (the basis for building any unit) is so jacked up that it is nearly criminal. So before the academic side is introduced in any substantive way, HTS is hard-broke.
This is not indicative of how things should be; much of the academic criticism misses that critical start point.
Hello,
Does anyone have any comments on Glevum’s operations in Kabul? Thanks