In Harmonium

One of the biggest problems with study the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan has been the quality of the information available.  Much of the available information is slanted and, often, unsourced: it may be good, but it may also be terrible – without sourcing it is hard to know.  This is why the Mosul Case Study is so important.

The Mosul Case Study was produced by the Joint Center for International Security Forces Advising, by MAJ Rob Thornton.  The description, from the Executive Summary, reads as follows:

Major Thornton of JCISFA in coordination with Dr. John Fishel from the University of Oklahoma, Dr. Marc Tyrrell of Carleton University, and Mr. Mark Lauber also of JCISFA sat down to write the Mosul Case study with the goals of considering the requirements generated in the pursuit of policy and military objectives in complex conditions, and making some observations and recommendations about how DoD might better address those requirements. To this end the Case Study is built around a specific place, Mosul, Iraq over a short period of time, 2006-2007. The Case Study is designed to give the reader both an understanding of content and context of the environment, and of the objective and the subjective nature of the participants.

In early January, MAJ Thornton and I presented on the case study and had the opportunity to sit down and talk about it in person (I had known Rob for several years, but this was our first face to face meeting).  Over the course of several days of conversation, one of the rationales behind the production of the case study became clear: the military, at least at JCISFA, were quite serious about engaging the academic community in order to try and find out where they went wrong as well as where they went right.

The Mosul Case Study is, possibly, the most obvious and overt attempt to engage the academic community that JCISFA has produced to date.  The reason why I say this is simple: it is exceedingly rare for any US military publication to provide the raw data on which it is based.  For the Mosul Case Study, the raw data is a series of interviews conducted over several months with the key players in the US occupation of Mosul between 2006-07.  These interviews are provided to the academic community and general public in order to stimulate discussion and and, most importantly, analysis.

If anyone uses these interviews as the basis of articles, stories or blog posts, please let me know and I will put up a link to them here.

The full case Study was originally published without Chapter 4 at the Small Wars Journal (I was held up in writing it).  An updated version, to include Chapter 4, will be up there soon.  Meanwhile, it is available here For those interested in the Interviews, they are available in both the full case study and in a smaller document (Mosul Case Study: Executive Summary and Interviews).

One final note:  Given the rapid turn around in trying to get the case study out, there was insufficient time for solid editing.  There are some typos, spelling mistakes and grammatical errors that will be fixed in later editions.